Case of the Day: Kerajaan Republik Demokratik Rakyat Laos v. Hongsa Lingitwe Co.

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I have an update on the Thai-Lao Lignite case today. Here is my description of the case from a prior post:

Lignite is a low-quality coal used for generating electricity. The Hongsa region of Laos, near the Thai border, has it, and in the early 1990s, Thailand needed to import electricity. And so a joint venture was born. Thai-Lao Lignite, a Thai company, entered into a Project Development Agreement with the Lao government giving it exclusive exploration and mining rights in the region. The idea was that Thai-Lao Lignite would build a Lignite-fired power plant on the Lao side of the border, and Laos would sell the electricity to Thailand. The PDA called for Thai-Lao Lignite to organize another entity, Thai-Lao Power Co., under Lao law, and to assign its rights and obligations under the PDA to the Lao company. Thai-Lao Lignite never made the assignment, and the Lao government dealt with Thai-Lao Lignite as though it were a proper party to the PDA. The PDA had an arbitration agreement calling for arbitration in Malaysia at the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules.The substantive law governing the contract was the law of New York. A dispute developed …

Thai-Lao Lignite demanded arbitration. The parties agreed that the ICC would replace the Kuala Lumpur Regional Center as the appointing authority. The tribunal issued an award in favor of Thai-Lao Lignite in 2009.

I’ve written about the case several times before. First was Judge Kimba Woods’s decision confirming the arbitral award over an objection that the tribunal had wrongfully decided a question of arbitrability. Second and third, I wrote about some questions of post-judgment discovery. Last, I covered the Second Circuit’s summary order affirming the judgment, its denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, and Laos’s filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari: the case is on my Supreme Court watch list.

Now the Malaysian courts have thrown a monkey wrench into the case by annulling the award. In today’s case of the day, the court, without much analysis—and with no discussion of the New York decisions—held that part of the dispute was not arbitrable. There’s no question that under the New York Convention, the Malaysian courts are proper courts to set aside the award. The docket does not reflect any proceedings in New York on account of the annulment, but no doubt we will soon see motions seeking to reopen the judgment and arguments about the preclusive about the effect, if any, to be given to the judge’s decision to confirm in light of the later Malaysian decision annulling the award.

The new decision is obviously a victory for Laos, but in a strange way it could be a defeat, too. It seems to me that whatever the chances of Supreme Court review were before the annulment, they are lower now, because the issue of arbitrability isn’t as clean as it was before. I’ll keep you posted on how this develops.

Photo credit: Library of Congress

About Ted Folkman

Ted Folkman is a shareholder with Murphy & King, a Boston law firm, where he has a complex business litigation practice. He is the author of International Judicial Assistance (MCLE 2012), a nuts-and-bolts guide to international judicial assistance issues, and of the chapter on service of process in the ABA's forthcoming treatise on International Aspects of US Litigation, and he is the publisher of Letters Blogatory, the Web's first blog devoted to international judicial assistance, which the ABA recognized as one of the best 100 legal blogs in 2012, 2014, and 2015.

2 thoughts on “Case of the Day: Kerajaan Republik Demokratik Rakyat Laos v. Hongsa Lingitwe Co.

  1. Just wondering about this case. Al Fayed v. CIA, 229 F.3d 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

    The Republic of Ecuador has sought judicial assistance under section 1782 in several Chevron/Ecuador proceedings including in the interesting appeal pending before the 5th Circuit, #12-20123.

    A sovereign is a “person” when seeking judicial assistance under the statute but a not a”person” when judicial assistance is being sought from the sovereign? Somewhat of an anomaly.

    1. Thanks, L. Conrad, for the note! I made a similar observation in my post on Ecuador’s judicial assistance application in Colorado, Ecuador v. Bjorkman. Note that in that case, Ecuador included its attorney general as one of the applicants for judicial assistance, which in my mind is a clear way around the Al Fayed problem, and which has accepted analogues elsewhere in US law (e.g., in some kinds of cases you sue the officer rather than the United States itself for sovereign immunity reasons).

      I will take a look at the Fifth Circuit appeal you reference.

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