Archive | Conflict of Laws

Guest Post: Comments on the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs Enforcement Action in Canada

I asked esteemed fellow blogger Antonin I. Pribetic to help me and Letters Blogatory readers get a grip on the Canadian law that will be at issue in the new Ontario case, and I’m delighted he’s agreed. Antonin is a trial and appellate lawyer practicing in Toronto with a focus on international litigation and arbitration. He is also the author of The Trial Warrior Blog.

My thanks to Ted Folkman for inviting me to write a guest post as a follow-up to the excellent Symposium recently hosted here at Letters Blogatory on forum non conveniens and enforcement of foreign judgments.

Unsurprisingly, a considerable amount of the discussions has revolved around the Chevron Ecuador litigation, including the Second Circuit’s decision in Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp. 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011).

As Ted reported here recently, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs have commenced an action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to enforce the Ecuador judgment against Chevron Corporation and its Canadian subsidiaries. A copy of the Statement of Claim in Yaiguaje et al. v. Chevron Corporation et al. (Court File No. CV-12-454778) is available here (the “Ontario Enforcement Action”).

This post will provide an overview of the impeachment defenses available in Canada for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and will offer some thoughts on the apparent ‘reverse veil-piercing’ theory implicit in the Statement of Claim in the Ontario Enforcement Action.

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Major Jurisdictional Decisions In Canada

Canadian lawyers are pretty excited about a series of decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada on personal jurisdiction of foreign defendants and forum non conveniens. H/T to esteemed fellow-bloggers Kenneth Dekker of The Litigator and Antonin Pribetic of The Trial Warrior, who have both posted on the cases.

Conrad Black

Conrad Black, Baron Black of Crossharbour

I will leave the real commentary on these cases to the Canadians. I’ll just comment briefly on the juiciest of the three cases, Breeden v. Black, which was a Canadian libel case brought by the disgraced press baron, Conrad Black, Baron Black of Crossharbour, against officers and directors of his company, Hollinger International, Inc., who, after an investigation, determined that Hollinger had improperly paid Lord Black millions of dollars, to the detriment of shareholders. The saga was the subject of much litigation in the United States. Lord Black was indicted and convicted of mail fraud and obstruction of justice. Though his conviction on some of the charges was vacated on appeal, he remains in prison. Lord Black’s stewardship of other people’s money was the subject of a withering opinion by Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court, which you can read at 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004) if you are interested. The special committee of Hollinger’s board that conducted the investigation of Lord Black’s self-dealing posted the results of the investigation on its website, leading to the claim of libel. May I say that I find it amusing that Lord Black, former owner of a British newspaper, should be a plaintiff in a libel case?

The gist of the case is that the Canadian courts could properly exercise jurisdiction over the US defendants, on the grounds that the tort had occurred in Canada, where the supposed libels were published; and that the lower court judge had not abused his discretion by refusing to dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds (though Justice LeBel, who wrote the opinion, found that many of the forum non conveniens factors favored trial in Illinois, and I have the sense that he would have ruled in favor of trial in Illinois had he been the judge in the first instance).

A few points of interest:

  • There seemed to be no question that a Canadian judgment in favor of Lord Black, if he prevails, will be unenforceable in the United States. Presumably this is on account of the SPEECH Act. I would go further and say that if the case were litigated in the United States in the first instance, it is almost inconceivable that the report the directors put on their website would be found libelous. The First Amendment requires proof of actual malice in a case like this, and Lord Black almost certainly could not prevail under US law.
  • Two civil actions were pending in the United States at the time of the decision, charging Lord Black with breaches of fiduciary duty. What happens if the US actions are decided first, and Lord Black loses? Would a Canadian court apply non-mutual collateral estoppel? Canadian lawyers, please chime in!
  • The choice of law discussion is interesting. Justice LeBel makes a point of pointing out that Lord Black has “limited his claim to damages to his reputation in Ontario.” Does this make sense? Does a figure such as Lord Black have one reputation in Ontario and another reputation elsewhere? Even if that could have been the case in the past, in a global media culture I don’t think this is sensible.

Do read the posts on my Canadian colleagues’ blogs for more details.

Photo Credit: United States Marshal’s Service

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Case of the Day: Prism Investments BV v. van der Meer

European Court of Justice buildingsConflict of Laws.net had a post on a recent decision of the European Court of Justice, Prism Investments BV v. van der Meer. The facts were as follows: A Finnish bank loaned money to Arilco Opportune, which in turn lent the money to its Netherlands subsidiary, Arilco Holland. Arilco Holland transferred the funds to Prism Investments, another Netherlands company. The Rechtbank van Koophandel te Brussel (the Commercial Court of Brussels) ordered Arilco Opportune to repay the Finnish bank. Arilco Opportune appealed to the Hof van Beroep te Brussels (the Court of Appeals in Brussels), and in the appeal, Arilco Holland sought an order seeking reimbursement from Prism. The appellate court granted the order for reimbursement.

Later, Ariclo Holland was declared insolvent, and van der Meer, the receiver, sought an order from a Netherlands court, the Rechtsbank ‘s-Hertogenbosch, declaring the Belgian judgment against Prism on reimbursement to be enforceable (i.e., seeking recognition of the judgment). The court issued the order, and Prism sought to have it annulled on the grounds that Prism and Arilco Holland had already settled the matter in Belgium (the receiver “challenged that financial settlement in detail”, which I think means that he denied that the matter had been settled in the way Prism claimed). The Rechtsbank rejected Prism’s arguments on the grounds that under Article 45 of Regulation 44/2001, the grounds for non-recognition of the Belgian judgment were limited and did not include settlement of the underlying judgment. One of the few exceptions is for judgments that are manifestly contrary to public policy, and in its appeal to the Hoge Raad, Prism argued that public policy could not countenance recognition of a judgment that the defendant had already satisfied. The Hoge Raad was uncertain whether satisfaction of the judgment could be a defense to recognition, or whether it could only be a defense to an actual enforcement proceeding, and so it referred the question to the ECJ.

The ECJ held that because satisfaction of the judgment was not one of the specified grounds for non-recognition in Regulation 44/2001, the Netherlands court had to recognize the judgment. However, enforcement is another question.

According to the Court’s case-law, the enforceability of the judgment in question in the Member State of origin is a precondition for its enforcement in the Member State in which enforcement is sought. In that regard, although recognition must have the effect, in principle, of conferring on judgments the authority and effectiveness accorded to them in the Member State in which they were delivered, there is, however, no reason for granting to a judgment, when it is enforced, rights which it does not have in the Member State of origin or effects that a similar judgment given directly in the Member State in which enforcement is sought would not have.

This approach is the same approach that a state court in the US will (or should, at any rate) apply, I think, in determining the effect that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires it to give to the judgment of a sister state that had already been satisfied. Under § 116 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, “A judgment will not be enforced in other states if the judgment has been discharged by payment or otherwise under the local law of the state of rendition.” But that is not to say the judgment is not entitled to recognition:

The recognition to which a foreign judgment is entitled will not usually be affected by its payment or other discharge. Following its discharge, the judgment will usually continue to have the same res judicata effect in the state of rendition, both as to the parties and the issues involved, that it enjoyed theretofore. The judgment will be given the same res judicata effect in other states that it has in the state of rendition subject to the considerations stated in §§ 94-95. As between States of the United States, the giving of such res judicata effect is required by full faith and credit.

It’s interesting to watch European solutions to problems of federalism converge, at least in this instance, on US solutions!

Photo credit: Razvan Orendovici (license)

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