Bill Dodge has a good post at the Transnational Litigation Blog about today’s case of the day, Yukos Capital Ltd. v. Russian Federation (D.D.C. 2025). The case was for confirmation of an arbitral award. Yukos served process on Russia under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4) through diplomatic channels. But the method was unusual. Typically, when you have to serve process in this way, you request the State Department to make service, and the State Department arranges for the US embassy abroad to deliver the papers, with a diplomatic note, to the Foreign Ministry. This is what the State Department’s regulations generally provide (22 C.F.R. § 93.1), though the regulation provides that “If the foreign state so requests or if otherwise appropriate,” the State Department can instead deliver the papers and the diplomatic note “to the embassy of the foreign state in the District of Columbia.”

Here, the State Department delivered the papers with a diplomatic note to the Russian embassy in Washington. I don’t know why the State Department did things that way. In any event, Russia argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because it had not been properly served. It argued that the service was improper because Russia refused delivery of the papers at the embassy, and thus it was not “appropriate,” to use the word of the regulation, to serve process at the embassy, especially in light of the inviolability of the embassy premises under the Vienna Convention.

The judge rejected Russia’s position. Some of his reasoning is not persuasive to me. For example, he argued that requiring service on the foreign ministry in Moscow instead of the embassy would make § 1608(a)(4) duplicative of § 1608(a)(3), which provides for service on the Foreign Minister. But that seems clearly wrong to me. Section 1608(a)(3) provides for service on the foreign minister by postal channels, while § 1608(a)(4) provides for service by diplomatic channels. Also, 1608(a)(3) calls for service on the foreign minister, a distinction that has been inportant in prior cases. ¹

He also reasoned that the regulation merely regulated the State Department’s internal processes and that a violation of the regulation—if there was a violation—would not render the service improper. But it seems to me that the contents of the regulation might be evidence of what the United States position is on the requirements of customary international law.

I agree with everything Bill writes in his post, though I think that the issue really boils down to the question of what customary international law has to say, a point the judge did not really address. The U.N. Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Properties (which is not a binding treaty) suggests that service of process in the circumstances of cases like this must be by “transmission through diplomatic channels to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State concerned.” But maybe the Convention doesn’t accurately state the customary international law on this point. Bill writes: “Even if one could show widespread practice limiting transmission of service through diplomatic channels to foreign ministries, one would have to show that such practice was followed from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) in order to establish a rule of customary international law.”

I don’t know the answer to the customary international law question. But surely the safer course is to transmit the document to the Foreign Ministry rather than the embassy, if only to avoid needless litigation about service.

1. The Kumar case suggests some uncertainty about Bill’s point that there is no Vienna Convention issue here. ↩︎