The case of the day is Mercuria Energy Group Ltd. v. Republic of Poland (D.C. Cir. 2026). Mercuria had won an arbitration against Poland in Sweden arising out of a fine that Poland had imposed on the company. A Swedish court, though, annulled the award, because EU law “prohibit[s] the enforcement of arbitration awards between member states.” I think that is meant to refer to the EU rule that doesn’t allow traditional investor-state arbitration under treaties between member states. Anyway, Mercuria sought recognition and enforcement of the award in Washington. The New York Convention allows a court to refuse recognition if the award “has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.” But how should courts exercise that discretion? Courts should recognize an award in such cases only when the decision to set it aside is “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the United States.” The district court refused to recognize the award, and Mercuria appealed.
It is unclear in the DC Circuit whether the court should review such a decision de novo, or just for abuse of discretion. Either way, though, the court held that the district court’s order should be affirmed. Unlike a case like Pemex (I covered the district court decision in that case many years ago, though not the Second Circuit’s decision), there were no special facts that made the Swedish court’s decision seem wrong or dishonest or egregious.
Judge Randolph, who wrote the short opinion, also filed a separate occurrence casting doubt on the correctness of the “basic notions of morality and justice” standard. He points out that it isn’t in the text of the Convention or the FAA. He has a point, and maybe the wording is not as technical as it could be. But ignoring a decision at the seat of the arbitration to set aside an award should be very, very difficult to ignore, in my view, because the award is made under the law of the seat. That’s my way of planting a flag against the idea that international arbitration is sui generis and doesn’t have its source in national law.
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