Professor Whytock’s comment today correctly notes in its next-to-last paragraph that “the ship of case-specific exceptions has set sail.” This statement is in response to my comments on the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act and the 2005 ALI Proposed Federal Statute. It is important to take account not just of the national context for this discussion, but of the global context as well.

That global context includes the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. While the Convention has not yet gone into effect, Mexico has acceded to it and both the United States and the European Union have signed, thus indicating their intention to move forward with ratification and implementation. The Convention provides a parallel to the New York Arbitration Convention, by providing that courts in Contracting States shall (1) recognize and enforce exclusive choice of court agreements (Article 5); (2) defer to courts chosen in such agreements (Article 6); and (3) recognize and enforce the judgments resulting from litigation based on such agreements (Article 8). In Article 9, the Hague Convention contains a carefully constructed set of bases for non-recognition of a foreign judgment. That list includes the following:

(e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State.

The official report to the Convention, at paragraph 189, states that the second part of this provision “is intended to focus attention on serious procedural failings in the particular case at hand.” Thus the ship of case-specific exceptions has not only set sail in the United States, but globally as well. If it is appropriate to allow case-specific review for due process purposes when both parties have explicitly agreed to have the case heard in the court that has rendered the judgment, it seems reasonable to allow the same when one party has specifically requested (through forum non conveniens) that the case be heard in the court that has rendered the judgment.

I noted both in my Columbia Law Review Sidebar comments, and my comments on this blog yesterday, that any adjustment to U.S. law on either forum non conveniens or the recognition of foreign judgments should be accomplished only within the context of our global relationships on these issues. In this regard, unilateral liberalization of our standards for recognition of judgments could harm the U.S. position in the current efforts at the Hague Conference on Private International Law to resurrect the judgments portion of the general jurisdiction and judgments convention negotiations that occurred during the 1990’s. At the April 2012 Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, an experts group was asked to continue discussion of this project. History has demonstrated that unilateral liberalization of U.S. rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments places us in a very difficult negotiating position when trying to get other states to extend similar treatment to U.S. judgments.

Both the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the law of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are parts of a global framework of laws that deal with questions raised by the fact that jurisdiction may be available in multiple courts. Potential for forum shopping raises the possibility of parallel litigation, and states differ in their legal approach to these issues. Just as the 2005 Hague Convention provides an example of a global position on review of case-specific due process for judgments recognition purposes, Articles 21 and 22 of the 2001 Hague Interim Text for a convention on jurisdiction and judgments provide an example of a compromise between the strict civil law lis pendens approach to parallel litigation and the discretionary common law forum non conveniens approach. These should be part of the discussion of any U.S. developments in either of these two important areas of private international law.