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	Comments on: Case of the Day: Palladian Partners v. Province of Buenos Aires	</title>
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	<description>The Blog of International Judicial Assistance</description>
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		<title>
		By: Ted Folkman		</title>
		<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2022/11/07/case-of-the-day-palladian-partners-v-province-of-buenos-aires/#comment-3673</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ted Folkman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Nov 2022 00:16:34 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Thanks Bill! I agree that &quot;subject of the action&quot; refers to the subject of the &lt;em&gt;recognition&lt;/em&gt; action, not the subject of the &lt;em&gt;underlying&lt;/em&gt; action. But why would we think that the property you hope to seize is the subject of a judgment recognition action? You might just as well say that in any damages case, the damages the plaintiff hopes to get are the subject of the action. I think that as a matter of good policy that you should be able to seek recognition of an award or judgment wherever the losing party has reachable assets, but I am not sure that the venue statute as written lets us accommodate that.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks Bill! I agree that &#8220;subject of the action&#8221; refers to the subject of the <em>recognition</em> action, not the subject of the <em>underlying</em> action. But why would we think that the property you hope to seize is the subject of a judgment recognition action? You might just as well say that in any damages case, the damages the plaintiff hopes to get are the subject of the action. I think that as a matter of good policy that you should be able to seek recognition of an award or judgment wherever the losing party has reachable assets, but I am not sure that the venue statute as written lets us accommodate that.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Bill Dodge		</title>
		<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2022/11/07/case-of-the-day-palladian-partners-v-province-of-buenos-aires/#comment-3672</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bill Dodge]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Nov 2022 21:03:37 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Ted, this is a fascinating case. Thanks for bringing it to our attention. I agree with the interpretation of contractual venue provision. I disagree with the interpretation of 1391(f). It seems to me that &quot;subject of the action&quot; refers to the action to enforce the award, not the original action. That is particularly true in light of Mobil Cerro Negro’s holding that the FSIA requires a separate plenary action to enforce an investor-state award. I have discussed this question and others relating to the enforcement of investor-state awards in a contribution to a festschrift for George Bermann available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3855640.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ted, this is a fascinating case. Thanks for bringing it to our attention. I agree with the interpretation of contractual venue provision. I disagree with the interpretation of 1391(f). It seems to me that &#8220;subject of the action&#8221; refers to the action to enforce the award, not the original action. That is particularly true in light of Mobil Cerro Negro’s holding that the FSIA requires a separate plenary action to enforce an investor-state award. I have discussed this question and others relating to the enforcement of investor-state awards in a contribution to a festschrift for George Bermann available here: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3855640" rel="nofollow ugc">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3855640</a>.</p>
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