<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	
	>
<channel>
	<title>
	Comments on: Case of the Day: Community of Hippopotamuses v. Ministerio de Ambiente	</title>
	<atom:link href="https://lettersblogatory.com/2021/10/25/case-of-the-day-community-of-hippopotamuses-v-ministerio-de-ambiente/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2021/10/25/case-of-the-day-community-of-hippopotamuses-v-ministerio-de-ambiente/</link>
	<description>The Blog of International Judicial Assistance</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 10 Nov 2024 23:31:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>
	<item>
		<title>
		By: Ted Folkman		</title>
		<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2021/10/25/case-of-the-day-community-of-hippopotamuses-v-ministerio-de-ambiente/#comment-3602</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ted Folkman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Oct 2021 22:16:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://lettersblogatory.com/?p=30576#comment-3602</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In reply to &lt;a href=&quot;https://lettersblogatory.com/2021/10/25/case-of-the-day-community-of-hippopotamuses-v-ministerio-de-ambiente/#comment-3601&quot;&gt;kotodama&lt;/a&gt;.

Thanks Kotodama! Interesting comment. First, I agree with you that in some respects we treat corporations &lt;em&gt;too much&lt;/em&gt; like human beings, when, for instance, we grant them rights under the Free Exercise Clause or perhaps when we grant them political speech rights under the First Amendment. On the other hand, it makes perfect sense to treat corporations as legal persons as a general matter, because they are simply aggregations of individual human beings, namely, the shareholders. If people can have rights and obligations, then why should not &lt;em&gt;associations&lt;/em&gt; of people be able to have rights and obligations? Corporations, whether business corporations or other incorporated associations of people, were a major step forward in our history because they allowed people to aggregate their interests in an important way (and to shield themselves from individual legal liabilities, of course!) 

Now, what about non-human animals? Of course no one says that a hippo is just like a person in every respect. And everyone should agree that animals have a moral status that inanimate things do not, so that it is wrong, for example, to be cruel to an animal. And everyone should also bear in mind that there are difficult questions about when human beings do or do not satisfy the usual criteria for personhood, e.g., fetuses, newborns, people in irreversible comas, people who have suffered brain-death, etc. I think there are three important things going on:

1. A hippo can&#039;t have duties in the way that a person does, i.e., it can&#039;t be morally responsible in the way a person is.
2. A case like the one I&#039;ve written about here is a very good example of the way in which advocates for animal personhood are really trying to advance their own interests, or what they think are the interests of the world at large, rather than the interests of the hippos. If the hippos could speak, do you think they would make the same demands their lawyer is making? Hardly. In a legal sense, saying &quot;animals are people&quot; in this kind of litigation is just a way of saying, &quot;I, a lawyer with an interest in the environment, say, have standing to bring claims in court to try to accomplish what I cannot accomplish politically.&quot;
3. Law is a human institution, made by humans for humans. 

Maybe you would find &lt;a href=&quot;https://lettersblogatory.com/2018/12/21/persons/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow ugc&quot;&gt;this post from 2018&lt;/a&gt; interesting. Curious to hear your reactions!]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In reply to <a href="https://lettersblogatory.com/2021/10/25/case-of-the-day-community-of-hippopotamuses-v-ministerio-de-ambiente/#comment-3601">kotodama</a>.</p>
<p>Thanks Kotodama! Interesting comment. First, I agree with you that in some respects we treat corporations <em>too much</em> like human beings, when, for instance, we grant them rights under the Free Exercise Clause or perhaps when we grant them political speech rights under the First Amendment. On the other hand, it makes perfect sense to treat corporations as legal persons as a general matter, because they are simply aggregations of individual human beings, namely, the shareholders. If people can have rights and obligations, then why should not <em>associations</em> of people be able to have rights and obligations? Corporations, whether business corporations or other incorporated associations of people, were a major step forward in our history because they allowed people to aggregate their interests in an important way (and to shield themselves from individual legal liabilities, of course!) </p>
<p>Now, what about non-human animals? Of course no one says that a hippo is just like a person in every respect. And everyone should agree that animals have a moral status that inanimate things do not, so that it is wrong, for example, to be cruel to an animal. And everyone should also bear in mind that there are difficult questions about when human beings do or do not satisfy the usual criteria for personhood, e.g., fetuses, newborns, people in irreversible comas, people who have suffered brain-death, etc. I think there are three important things going on:</p>
<p>1. A hippo can&#8217;t have duties in the way that a person does, i.e., it can&#8217;t be morally responsible in the way a person is.<br />
2. A case like the one I&#8217;ve written about here is a very good example of the way in which advocates for animal personhood are really trying to advance their own interests, or what they think are the interests of the world at large, rather than the interests of the hippos. If the hippos could speak, do you think they would make the same demands their lawyer is making? Hardly. In a legal sense, saying &#8220;animals are people&#8221; in this kind of litigation is just a way of saying, &#8220;I, a lawyer with an interest in the environment, say, have standing to bring claims in court to try to accomplish what I cannot accomplish politically.&#8221;<br />
3. Law is a human institution, made by humans for humans. </p>
<p>Maybe you would find <a href="https://lettersblogatory.com/2018/12/21/persons/" rel="nofollow ugc">this post from 2018</a> interesting. Curious to hear your reactions!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: kotodama		</title>
		<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2021/10/25/case-of-the-day-community-of-hippopotamuses-v-ministerio-de-ambiente/#comment-3601</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[kotodama]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Oct 2021 20:39:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://lettersblogatory.com/?p=30576#comment-3601</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Yes, obviously hippos aren&#039;t literally people, but at least they&#039;re actual living creatures, mammals, have some measure of intelligence, don&#039;t bother humans unless provoked, and perform a beneficial role in their native ecosystem.  That&#039;s more than one can say about corporations, but yet they&#039;re treated as legal persons with free speech and free exercise rights even!  
.
Of course the &quot;views&quot; of the corporation are just the views of its management.  And sometimes you have disagreements between management and shareholders over the &quot;best interests&quot; of the corporation, which is why demand letters exist in derivative suits.
.
Nowadays, people are even putting forth the claim that AI software--which is just, at the end of the day, a long list of instructions to be carried out by a CPU--can be a &quot;person&quot; for patent inventor purposes.  And somehow those people aren&#039;t being immediately laughed out of the room.
.
So, given all that, it doesn&#039;t seem too farfetched to say that animals like hippos could be treated as *legal* persons too.  Whether a hippo ought to be sterilized or put down likewise doesn&#039;t seem that difficult an issue for some court to adjudicate.  Courts do things like that all the time.  Just look at, famously, the Terri Schiavo case.  
.
The assumption seems to be that someone advocating for animal legal personhood *literally* believes the animals are no different from people.  I&#039;m not sure that assumption is so well-supported.  Maybe some do believe that, but I don&#039;t think all of them do.  Anyway, nobody blinks an eye when a pro or college football player declares on national TV that his team won because his prayers were pleasing to an imaginary sky fairy.  I also detect an undertone of extreme cynicism--a tacit suggestion that anyone who claims to be interested in animal welfare is putting on an act and harbors some malevolent ulterior motive.
.
To be clear, I&#039;m not taking a position on any of the merits issues.  All I&#039;m saying is it doesn&#039;t seem so outside the realm of possibility for animals to be considered legal persons at least in some contexts and for some purposes, and likewise I see no reason to think courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate these kinds of issues.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, obviously hippos aren&#8217;t literally people, but at least they&#8217;re actual living creatures, mammals, have some measure of intelligence, don&#8217;t bother humans unless provoked, and perform a beneficial role in their native ecosystem.  That&#8217;s more than one can say about corporations, but yet they&#8217;re treated as legal persons with free speech and free exercise rights even!<br />
.<br />
Of course the &#8220;views&#8221; of the corporation are just the views of its management.  And sometimes you have disagreements between management and shareholders over the &#8220;best interests&#8221; of the corporation, which is why demand letters exist in derivative suits.<br />
.<br />
Nowadays, people are even putting forth the claim that AI software&#8211;which is just, at the end of the day, a long list of instructions to be carried out by a CPU&#8211;can be a &#8220;person&#8221; for patent inventor purposes.  And somehow those people aren&#8217;t being immediately laughed out of the room.<br />
.<br />
So, given all that, it doesn&#8217;t seem too farfetched to say that animals like hippos could be treated as *legal* persons too.  Whether a hippo ought to be sterilized or put down likewise doesn&#8217;t seem that difficult an issue for some court to adjudicate.  Courts do things like that all the time.  Just look at, famously, the Terri Schiavo case.<br />
.<br />
The assumption seems to be that someone advocating for animal legal personhood *literally* believes the animals are no different from people.  I&#8217;m not sure that assumption is so well-supported.  Maybe some do believe that, but I don&#8217;t think all of them do.  Anyway, nobody blinks an eye when a pro or college football player declares on national TV that his team won because his prayers were pleasing to an imaginary sky fairy.  I also detect an undertone of extreme cynicism&#8211;a tacit suggestion that anyone who claims to be interested in animal welfare is putting on an act and harbors some malevolent ulterior motive.<br />
.<br />
To be clear, I&#8217;m not taking a position on any of the merits issues.  All I&#8217;m saying is it doesn&#8217;t seem so outside the realm of possibility for animals to be considered legal persons at least in some contexts and for some purposes, and likewise I see no reason to think courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate these kinds of issues.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Caroline Polisi		</title>
		<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2021/10/25/case-of-the-day-community-of-hippopotamuses-v-ministerio-de-ambiente/#comment-3600</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Caroline Polisi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Oct 2021 11:50:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://lettersblogatory.com/?p=30576#comment-3600</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This is too much!]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is too much!</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
