Case of the Day: In re Kleimar N.V.

The case of the day is In re Application of Kleimar N.V. (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Kleimar was engaged in an arbitration against Dalian Dongzhan Group Co. before the London Maritime Arbitration Association. Kleimer brought a § 1782 application seeking leave to take discovery from Vale S.A., a non-party, for use in the arbitration. The issue was whether the LMAA tribunal, a private arbitral tribunal, is a “tribunal” for purposes of § 1782.

I have written about this issue several times, most recently (and perhaps curtly) in April 2016, and earlier here, here and here. Second Circuit precedent has held that private arbitral tribunals are not tribunals for purposes of § 1782, but the judge was persuaded in light of dicta in Intel that the Supreme Court might consider overruling precedents such as the Second Circuit precedent, and he held, without much discussion of the rationale, that the LMAA was indeed a tribunal for purposes of the statute. It is interesting to me to see a district court judge stick his neck out like this. I’m not sure I understand the reason. I don’t think anything in Intel is likely to persuade the Second Circuit to reverse itself, if this decision is appealed.

It seems to me that many of the cases, and my own posts, have been pretty conclusory on this question, one way or the other. The closest looks I’ve taken are here and here. It’s true that some legislative history supports the idea that a private arbitral tribunal should count as a “tribunal” for purposes of the statute. One of the leading drafters, Hans Smit, took the view that they should, and the amended statute refers to “a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” instead of a “judicial proceeding,” as did the prior statute. On the other hand, I think there are sound policy reasons to go the other way. It makes little sense for litigants in foreign arbitrations to have greater access to US discovery procedures than do litigants in domestic arbitrations (where courts will enforce subpoenas issued by arbitrators but will not allow the parties to apply for judicial assistance without an arbitrator’s order). Granted, as Gary Born and others have pointed out, the foreign arbitrator can forbid recourse to § 1782, which would bring the non-circumvention factor in Intel into play. Moreover, in practice, parties that agree to arbitration are often motivated by a desire to avoid US-style discovery, and it seems sound (though this is not really a matter contemplated in Intel) to say that allowing § 1782 to be used in such cases is contrary to the spirit at least of the parties’ agreement. A pithier but less useful way to put this is that you shouldn’t be able to have your cake and eat it, too.

About Ted Folkman

Ted Folkman is a shareholder with Murphy & King, a Boston law firm, where he has a complex business litigation practice. Folkman also serves as an arbitrator and is a member of the Commercial and Consumer Panels of the American Arbitration Association. He is the author of International Judicial Assistance (MCLE 2d ed. 2016), a nuts-and-bolts guide to international judicial assistance issues, and of the chapter on service of process in the ABA's treatise on International Aspects of US Litigation (J. Berger, ed. 2017), and he is the publisher of Letters Blogatory, the Web's first blog devoted to international judicial assistance, which the ABA recognized as one of the best 100 legal blogs in 2012 and 2014 - 2016.

5 thoughts on “Case of the Day: In re Kleimar N.V.

  1. I completely agree with this analysis.
    The reasoning against extending the section to foreign arbitrations is, however, the same that French legal scholars have expressed about Section 1782 in general.

    1. Vivian, thanks for the observation! It seems to me the situations are dissimilar, though. In the arbitration context, the question is, “what does the statute mean?” In the French context, the question is, “is the statute wise,” or “is the statute consistent with international law,” or whatever.

      1. Ted, I was referring to your reference to “having your cake and eating it too”, rather than to the Intel issue of what a “tribunal” is within the meaning of the statute: in the litigation situation the foreign plaintiff brings suit in France, yet may be able to gain discovery rights over a French defendant not available in France. Naturally the differences between an arbitral agreement where the parties originally may have had a shared purpose of avoiding U.S. discovery would remain a distinguishing factor, but the essential gist seems to me not so very different.

        1. That’s a good point, Vivian. My favorite cases, though, are those where the party seeking US discovery is French (or German, or whatever). The continental lawyers hold up their noses at our pretrial discovery system until they need it, and then they are like kids in a candy store (a broad overgeneralization, of course)!

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