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	Comments on: Paper of the Day: Litigation Isolationism	</title>
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	<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2015/01/19/paper-day-litigation-isolationism/</link>
	<description>The Blog of International Judicial Assistance</description>
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		By: jwb		</title>
		<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2015/01/19/paper-day-litigation-isolationism/#comment-2092</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[jwb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2015 14:41:32 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[Interesting article, thanks for the review. The author argues that one of the primary downsides of so-called &#039;litigation isolationism&#039; is that US courts are turned into fora for recognition and enforcement actions in cases that could and perhaps should have been brought in the first instance in U.S. courts. I find it perplexing that the author suggests that U.S. courts will give Defendants a better shake than foreign courts but then acknowledges that Defendants are the main drivers of litigation isolationism.

Taking it as true that there is an international &quot;market&quot; for judicial fora, and that Defendants are the main drivers behind the litigation avoidance doctrines, then won&#039;t U.S. law simply adjust when it becomes more convenient for Defendants to litigate here as opposed to elsewhere? I.e., Defendants will stop raising or seek modifications to the forum non conveniens or personal jurisdiction defenses. Or they will seek to change the law of recognition. Isn&#039;t the Chevron litigation an example of the latter?]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting article, thanks for the review. The author argues that one of the primary downsides of so-called &#8216;litigation isolationism&#8217; is that US courts are turned into fora for recognition and enforcement actions in cases that could and perhaps should have been brought in the first instance in U.S. courts. I find it perplexing that the author suggests that U.S. courts will give Defendants a better shake than foreign courts but then acknowledges that Defendants are the main drivers of litigation isolationism.</p>
<p>Taking it as true that there is an international &#8220;market&#8221; for judicial fora, and that Defendants are the main drivers behind the litigation avoidance doctrines, then won&#8217;t U.S. law simply adjust when it becomes more convenient for Defendants to litigate here as opposed to elsewhere? I.e., Defendants will stop raising or seek modifications to the forum non conveniens or personal jurisdiction defenses. Or they will seek to change the law of recognition. Isn&#8217;t the Chevron litigation an example of the latter?</p>
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