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	Comments on: Syncrude Canada Ltd. v. Highland Consulting Group: A Reply to Ted Folkman	</title>
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	<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2013/01/21/syncrude-canada-ltd-v-highland-consulting-group-a-reply-to-ted-folkman/</link>
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		By: Ted Folkman		</title>
		<link>https://lettersblogatory.com/2013/01/21/syncrude-canada-ltd-v-highland-consulting-group-a-reply-to-ted-folkman/#comment-1049</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ted Folkman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Jan 2013 04:17:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://lettersblogatory.com/?p=12222#comment-1049</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[My learned friend Antonin Pribetic has &lt;a href=&quot;http://lettersblogatory.com/2013/01/21/syncrude-canada-ltd-v-highland-consulting-group-a-reply-to-ted-folkman/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow ugc&quot;&gt;argued&lt;/a&gt; that &lt;a href=&quot;http://canlii.ca/en/ab/abca/doc/2012/2012abca240/2012abca240.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow ugc&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Metcalfe Estate v. Yamaha Motor Powered Products Co.,&lt;/em&gt; 2012 ABCA 240&lt;/a&gt;, bears on &lt;a href=&quot;http://lettersblogatory.com/2013/01/17/case-of-the-day-syncrude-canada-ltd-v-highland-consulting-group/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow ugc&quot;&gt;my discussion&lt;/a&gt; of the &lt;em&gt;Syncrude Canada&lt;/em&gt; case. I&#039;m not really sure I see his point. In &lt;em&gt;Metcalfe,&lt;/em&gt; a Canadian plaintiff sought and obtained leave from the Alberta court to serve process &lt;em&gt;ex juris&lt;/em&gt; on Yamaha, a Japanese company, pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. (&quot;Service &lt;em&gt;ex juris,&lt;/em&gt;&quot; for American readers who, like me, had to look it up, simply means service outside of the court&#039;s territorial jurisdiction). After receiving leave, the plaintiff arranged for an attorney in Tokyo to send the papers to Yamaha by registered mail. The papers were accompanied by a letter stating that the plaintiff &quot;intended to serve the[] documents pursuant to the procedures outlined&quot; in the Convention, but that because &quot;the Japanese Central Authority, which is responsible for effecting service under the Convention, will take approximately 4 months to effect service,&quot; the plaintiff&#039;s lawyer &quot;is requesting your cooperation in expediting matters, and asks that you kindly accept service at this time so that they can dispense with the formality of serving these documents upon you via the Central Authority.&quot; Yamaha did not accept service, but the plaintiff, who had received the return receipt indicating that the registered mail had been delivered, asserted that service had been effected.

Everyone&#8212;including me and, I think, Antonin&#8212;is in agreement on the fact that because Alberta law required the documents to be served on Yamaha in Japan, the service had to comport with the Convention, because the Convention is, as they say, exclusive. This is the rule of &lt;em&gt;Volkswagen v. Schlunk.&lt;/em&gt; 

The court held, however, that the service did not comport with the Convention. It&#039;s not clear precisely what the court meant. Perhaps it meant that the service did not comport with the Convention because, although Article 10(a) of the Convention &lt;em&gt;permits&lt;/em&gt; service by postal channels, the law of Alberta did not &lt;em&gt;affirmatively authorize&lt;/em&gt; service by mail. This is a solid position that take seriously the wording of Article 10(a): &quot;Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention &lt;em&gt;shall not interfere with&lt;/em&gt;&#8212;the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.&quot; Some though not all US courts read Article 10(a) this way. On this view, it&#039;s not enough that the Convention permits service by mail; the law of the forum must also permit it. The judge in &lt;em&gt;Syncrude&lt;/em&gt; thought that Alberta law authorized service by mail, but maybe that&#039;s wrong, and I certainly will defer to the expertise of Canadian lawyers on that question. (I note, though, that in &lt;em&gt;Syncrude,&lt;/em&gt; the Canadian plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the US defendants, which suggests to me that the Alberta court also thought that service by mail was sufficient under Alberta law).

But I&#039;m not sure this is what the Alberta appellate court meant at all. Mr. Justice McDonald refers to Article 11 of the Convention in a way that suggests he thought it relevant. Article 11 provides: 

&quot;The present Convention shall not prevent two or more Contracting States from agreeing to permit, for the purpose of service of judicial documents, channels of transmission other than those provided for in the preceding Articles and, in particular, direct communication between their respective authorities.&quot;

If the suggestion is that service by postal channels is permitted only if the two states in question have made an agreement to permit it, then I think the court is pretty plainly misreading Article 11. Article 11, on its face, provides for methods of service &lt;em&gt;in addition to&lt;/em&gt; those in the preceding articles, including the methods in Article 10. The reference to &quot;direct communication between their respective authorities&quot; points to what the article has in mind: the United States and Canada, for example, could make an agreement permitting a US court to transmit papers to a Canadian court directly for service of process rather than making use of the central authority mechanism of Article 5.

In short: if Antonin is citing &lt;em&gt;Metcalfe&lt;/em&gt; to show that Alberta law does not authorize service of process by mail, then he may be right, and I happen to agree with the view that Article 10(a) itself does not permit service of mail where the law of the forum does not authorize service by mail. But if Antonin is citing &lt;em&gt;Metcalfe&lt;/em&gt; to show that service by mail was improper under the Convention regardless whether Alberta law authorized service by mail, then I think either he or the judges in &lt;em&gt;Metcalfe&lt;/em&gt; are just misreading the Convention. 

In any event, I think the outcome of &lt;em&gt;Metcalfe&lt;/em&gt; was correct, even if the reasoning was incorrect. It is apparent from the correspondence between the plaintiffs&#039; Tokyo attorney and Yamaha that the plaintiffs themselves were not purporting to serve process by mail, but rather to avoid the need for formal service of process. In the circumstances, Yamaha would at least have a strong argument that, to use American terminology, a holding that it had been effectively served would violate its due process rights, and likely Yamaha would also be able to argue persuasively that the service was not effective under the law of the forum. But to be clear: if the law of the forum authorizes service of process, and if the defendant is in a Convention state that, like Japan, has not objected to service of process by postal channels, then service of process by mail is proper under the Convention.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My learned friend Antonin Pribetic has <a href="http://lettersblogatory.com/2013/01/21/syncrude-canada-ltd-v-highland-consulting-group-a-reply-to-ted-folkman/" rel="nofollow ugc">argued</a> that <a href="http://canlii.ca/en/ab/abca/doc/2012/2012abca240/2012abca240.html" rel="nofollow ugc"><em>Metcalfe Estate v. Yamaha Motor Powered Products Co.,</em> 2012 ABCA 240</a>, bears on <a href="http://lettersblogatory.com/2013/01/17/case-of-the-day-syncrude-canada-ltd-v-highland-consulting-group/" rel="nofollow ugc">my discussion</a> of the <em>Syncrude Canada</em> case. I&#8217;m not really sure I see his point. In <em>Metcalfe,</em> a Canadian plaintiff sought and obtained leave from the Alberta court to serve process <em>ex juris</em> on Yamaha, a Japanese company, pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. (&#8220;Service <em>ex juris,</em>&#8221; for American readers who, like me, had to look it up, simply means service outside of the court&#8217;s territorial jurisdiction). After receiving leave, the plaintiff arranged for an attorney in Tokyo to send the papers to Yamaha by registered mail. The papers were accompanied by a letter stating that the plaintiff &#8220;intended to serve the[] documents pursuant to the procedures outlined&#8221; in the Convention, but that because &#8220;the Japanese Central Authority, which is responsible for effecting service under the Convention, will take approximately 4 months to effect service,&#8221; the plaintiff&#8217;s lawyer &#8220;is requesting your cooperation in expediting matters, and asks that you kindly accept service at this time so that they can dispense with the formality of serving these documents upon you via the Central Authority.&#8221; Yamaha did not accept service, but the plaintiff, who had received the return receipt indicating that the registered mail had been delivered, asserted that service had been effected.</p>
<p>Everyone&mdash;including me and, I think, Antonin&mdash;is in agreement on the fact that because Alberta law required the documents to be served on Yamaha in Japan, the service had to comport with the Convention, because the Convention is, as they say, exclusive. This is the rule of <em>Volkswagen v. Schlunk.</em> </p>
<p>The court held, however, that the service did not comport with the Convention. It&#8217;s not clear precisely what the court meant. Perhaps it meant that the service did not comport with the Convention because, although Article 10(a) of the Convention <em>permits</em> service by postal channels, the law of Alberta did not <em>affirmatively authorize</em> service by mail. This is a solid position that take seriously the wording of Article 10(a): &#8220;Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention <em>shall not interfere with</em>&mdash;the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.&#8221; Some though not all US courts read Article 10(a) this way. On this view, it&#8217;s not enough that the Convention permits service by mail; the law of the forum must also permit it. The judge in <em>Syncrude</em> thought that Alberta law authorized service by mail, but maybe that&#8217;s wrong, and I certainly will defer to the expertise of Canadian lawyers on that question. (I note, though, that in <em>Syncrude,</em> the Canadian plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the US defendants, which suggests to me that the Alberta court also thought that service by mail was sufficient under Alberta law).</p>
<p>But I&#8217;m not sure this is what the Alberta appellate court meant at all. Mr. Justice McDonald refers to Article 11 of the Convention in a way that suggests he thought it relevant. Article 11 provides: </p>
<p>&#8220;The present Convention shall not prevent two or more Contracting States from agreeing to permit, for the purpose of service of judicial documents, channels of transmission other than those provided for in the preceding Articles and, in particular, direct communication between their respective authorities.&#8221;</p>
<p>If the suggestion is that service by postal channels is permitted only if the two states in question have made an agreement to permit it, then I think the court is pretty plainly misreading Article 11. Article 11, on its face, provides for methods of service <em>in addition to</em> those in the preceding articles, including the methods in Article 10. The reference to &#8220;direct communication between their respective authorities&#8221; points to what the article has in mind: the United States and Canada, for example, could make an agreement permitting a US court to transmit papers to a Canadian court directly for service of process rather than making use of the central authority mechanism of Article 5.</p>
<p>In short: if Antonin is citing <em>Metcalfe</em> to show that Alberta law does not authorize service of process by mail, then he may be right, and I happen to agree with the view that Article 10(a) itself does not permit service of mail where the law of the forum does not authorize service by mail. But if Antonin is citing <em>Metcalfe</em> to show that service by mail was improper under the Convention regardless whether Alberta law authorized service by mail, then I think either he or the judges in <em>Metcalfe</em> are just misreading the Convention. </p>
<p>In any event, I think the outcome of <em>Metcalfe</em> was correct, even if the reasoning was incorrect. It is apparent from the correspondence between the plaintiffs&#8217; Tokyo attorney and Yamaha that the plaintiffs themselves were not purporting to serve process by mail, but rather to avoid the need for formal service of process. In the circumstances, Yamaha would at least have a strong argument that, to use American terminology, a holding that it had been effectively served would violate its due process rights, and likely Yamaha would also be able to argue persuasively that the service was not effective under the law of the forum. But to be clear: if the law of the forum authorizes service of process, and if the defendant is in a Convention state that, like Japan, has not objected to service of process by postal channels, then service of process by mail is proper under the Convention.</p>
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