the Court rejected the argument that either considerations of international comity or res judicata required it to recognize the decision of the court in Qatar. The District Court found that the courts of Qatar were not competent authorities “of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made”. The District Court did not consider that the substantive law of Qatar governed the dispute but instead ruled that only the courts of France could satisfy this prong for challenging the award. The Court apparently believed that governing law provision in the Convention’s list of cognizable objections embraced solely the procedural rather than the substantive rules adopted by the forum in which the arbitration took place. We have found no independent basis for that view.

I agree with Solomon that Judge Walton perhaps went astray in his treatment of the Qatari award, though in my post I had a slightly different emphasis. I take issue with Judge Walton’s conclusion that the Qatari court lacked “subject-matter jurisdiction” (his term). Given that the parties arguably consented to the Qatari proceedings, I think the question of the Qatari court’s jurisdiction is one for it to decide–I don’t see that it makes sense to talk about the Qatari court’s jurisdiction under a heading used to police the boundaries of the limited jurisdiction of our own federal courts. Once this jurisdictional point is out of the way, Solomon’s point about comity or res judicata is open for discussion.