Tag Archives | service by mail

Case of the Day: Wye Oak Technology v. Iraq

The case of the day is Wye Oak Technology v. Republic of Iraq (D.D.C. 2013). Wye Oak was an American defense contractor. In 2004, it contracted with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, and from 2004 to 2005, it repaired and refurbished several armored battalions and arranged for the sale of some metal as scrap. It sought payment of $24 million. In 2004, Dale Stoffel, the president of Wye Oak, and another employee were killed by unidentified gunmen when they traveled to Iraq to try to collect the payment, but whether the killings were related to the contract in any way was disputed.

Wye Oak sued Iraq in 2009. It attempted service by mail under 28 USC § 1608(a)(3) by sending the summons and complaint to the Iraqi embassy in Washington by FedEx. When that method failed, Wye Oak served the summons and complaint through the diplomatic channel under § 1608(a)(4).

Iraq moved to dismiss on the grounds that the attempt at service by mail did not comply with § 1608(a)(3), because Wye Oak had addressed the documents to the embassy rather than to the appropriate Iraqi official in Iraq. Since § 1608(a)(4) is inapplicable unless the plaintiff has first properly attempted service under § 1608(a)(3), Wye Oak argued, service was improper. The judge rejected Iraq’s argument, reasoning that “Wye Oak was not serving the Embassy itself or personnel within the Embassy, but rather attempting to use the Embassy as a conduit,” that “Wye Oak reasonably believed that the insecurity in Iraq rendered service of a government official there impossible,” and that “§ 1608(a)(3) does not prohibit this method of delivery.”

Iraq then sought reconsideration. The judge summarily denied the motion. Even if the service was technically improper, the judge held, there was no prejudice sufficient to make reconsideration appropriate, as there was no dispute that Iraq had received the documents through the diplomatic channel.

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Case of the Day: Jahanbin v. Rafieishad

The case of the day is Jahanbin v. Rafieishad (Ga. 2013). Jahanbin and Rafieishad, both Iranian nationals (Jahanbin also was a US national), married in Georgia in 2007. In 2011, Rafieishad began divorce proceedings against her husband, who then was in Iran, in the Fulton County Superior Court. After encountering difficulties in serving process, Rafieishad sought direction from the court, which entered an order instructing her to deliver the summons and complaint to the clerk, who was “directed to mail the correspondence” to Jahanbin in Tehran. The clerk, however, disregarded the order and handed the papers back to Rafieishad, instructing her to mail them herself, which she did. This was inconsistent with the literal language of the applicable Georgia rule, which, like FRCP 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), requires that the clerk address and dispatch the mail. The divorce case went to judgment, and Jahanbin moved to set aside the final judgment on the grounds that he had not validly been served with process. The judge denied his motion, and Jahanbin appealed.

On appeal, the court reversed and held that Jahanbin’s objection had merit. This is mindless formalism. Of course, parties should always strive to conform to applicable rules, and there are plenty of cases rejecting service under FRCP 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) where the party failed to request the clerk to mail the documents. Here, though, Rafieishad did everything right, and the clerk failed to follow the court’s order. Is there no argument that Rafieishad was acting as the clerk’s agent when she mailed the documents at the clerk’s direction? Is it sensible to reopen a divorce judgment on these grounds, where there does not appear to be any question about actual notice or prejudice?

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Case of the Day: Shoham v. Islamic Republic of Iran

The case of the day is Shoham v. Islamic Republic of Iran (D.D.C. 2013). Batsheva Shoham alleged that while she was driving in the West Bank with her infant son, she was ambushed by members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a terrorist group. One of the terrorists threw a stone that struck her son, killing him. In 2011, Mrs. Shoham and victims of similar attacks sued Iran, Syria, and others in the District of Columbia. Judge Collyer severed Mrs. Shoham’s claims from the action and granted her leave to refile with a new caption, noting that the summonses would have to be reissued and that the amended complaint would have to be served.

Mrs. Shoham then filed a new action, with a complaint identical to the complaint in the prior action, but with a new caption. The remaining plaintiffs in the first case managed to serve Iran and its instrumentalities with process via diplomatic channels. After the court ordered Mrs. Shoham to show cause why her new action should not be dismissed for want of prosecution (as she had filed no return of service after six months), Mrs. Shoham moved for entry of default judgment on the theory that despite Judge Collyer’s order, service of the original complaint in the first action sufficed. She cited precedents for the proposition that service of an amended complaint under the FSIA after a default by the foreign state is necesssary only if the amendments are substantial.

Judge Lamberth distinguished these cases on the grounds that they involved the service of an amended complaint in a single action, not, as was the case here, service of a complaint in an entirely new civil action. It hardly matters, from the jurisdictional point of view, whether the complaint in the second action was similar or even identical to the complaint in the first. However, the judge did give her additional time to effect service, and he blasted the government for the high fees it charges to effect service via diplomatic channels under the FSIA.

Mrs. Shoham also sought leave to serve Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, and Iran Air in Austrialia, Canada, France, Italy, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, by registered mail, return receipt requested. The judge granted the request. All three defendants are agencies or instrumentalities of Iran for purposes of the FSIA. Therefore, service was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b). Mrs. Shhoam had been unable to make service by registered mail at the defendants’ headquarters in Iran, and therefore her request was proper under § 1608(b)(3)(C), which permits service by delivery of the documents “as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made” when other means of service have failed. All of the countries named are parties to the Hague Service Convention, and none has objected to service by postal channels under Article 10(a). 1 The judge held, correctly, that service by mail under Article 10(a) despite the minority view to the contrary.

Note that § 1608(b)(3)(C) asks whether the service is “consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made.” Is there an issue about whether service by postal channels is consistent with the law of the state where service is to be made, particularly if in a particular state the Convention is not self-executing? The decision does not raise this issue, and I simply pose it as a question.

Notes:

  1. Australia requires that such service be by registered mail, return receipt requested, and I refer readers to one of my many discussions with Antonin Pribetić on the issue of service by mail in Canada.
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