Tag Archives | FAA

Case of the Day: Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia De Projecto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru

The case of the day is Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia De Projecto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru (2d Cir. 2011). Figueiredo, a Brazilian corporation, made a contract with the Programa Agua Para Todas, an instrumentality of the Peruvian government, to prepare engineering studies on water and sewage services. The contract contained an agreement to arbitrate disputes, and after a fee dispute arose, Figueiredo demanded arbitration. The arbitrator, sitting in Peru, awarded Figueiredo more than $21 million in damages, $5 million of which was principal and the remainder of which was accrued interest and cost of living adjustments. The Ministry of Housing, Construction, and Sanitation unsuccessfully sought to have the award nullified in the Court of Appeals in Lima. Figueiredo then moved for confirmation in New York. Peru is a party to both the New York Convention and the Panama Convention.

Peru opposed confirmation on a forum non conveniens theory (and on other theories, including a FSIA theory, which are not relevant to the case of the day). The district court denied Peru’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, a divided panel of the Second Circuit took the highly unusual step of reversing a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, focusing mainly on a Peruvian law that forbade a government agency from devoting more than 3% of its budget per year towards paying judgments. Allowing Figueiredo to look to the Peruvian defendants’ US assets in an attempt to get paid more quickly than Peruvian law permitted would, of course, run afoul of the statute, and the panel focused much of its attention on the importance of the Peruvian alw. In the background of the case was the Second Circuit’s decision in Monegasque de Reassurances v. NAK Naftogaz, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002), which held that forum non conveniens was a permissible defense to a motion for confirmation of an award under the New York Convention.

In light of Monegasque, the decision is not surprising. There is a strong argument that forum non conveniens should never be a defense to a motion to confirm an arbitral award, because the prevailing party should be entitled to look to the losing party’s assets anywhere in the world, and application of forum non conveniens seems to frustrate that end. But in light of Monegasque, it would be too much to expect a Second Circuit panel to adopt such a categorical rule. However, as Judge Lynch’s dissent shows, there are particularly strong reasons to think that the panel got this case wrong even in light of Monegasque. First, the majority focused on the public interest factors, which are, of course, relevant to any forum non conveniens analysis. But the court held that Peru’s substantive law—the 3% statute—caused the public interest factors to weigh in favor of a Peruvian forum for confirmation. As Judge Lynch points out, it is a bit startling for the substantive law that would govern if the case were heard in Peru to count as part of the public interest factors that weigh in favor of a Peruvian forum. Judge Lynch points out that the Supreme Court rejected the favorability of the foreign substantive law as a factor in the analysis in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Second, Monegasque affirmed a district court decision on forum non conveniens. This case reverses the district court. But even if the court’s basic approach is correct, I find it hard to see how the public interest factors could weigh so heavily in favor of Peru as to require a form non conveniens dismissal.

I agree with esteemed fellow blogger Marc J. Goldstein that Monegasque warrants en banc consideration.

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Case of the Day: A.O.A. v. Doe Run Resources Corp.

La Oroya, PeruThe case of the day, A.O.A. v. Doe Run Resources Corp. (E.D. Mo. 2011), is a little outside the official Letters Blogatory Scope of Coverage, but I cover it because it concerns two of our recurring themes: aggressive use of the FAA’s statute permitting removal of New York Convention cases, and Latin American toxic torts such as the Lago Agrio case in Ecuador or the banana pesticide case in Nicaragua.

For nearly a century, La Oroya, Peru has been home to smelters and refineries that produce copper, lead, zinc, and other metals from ores mined in the Andes Mountains. In 1974, the government of Peru nationalized the facility and transferred it to a Peruvian state-owned firm, Centromin. In the 1990s, Centromin determined that the refineries had caused significant pollution, including lead contamination in the soil, and Peru enacted a law known as the Programa de Adecación y Manejo Ambiental, which required Centromin to do a bunch of environmental remediation by 2007.

Meanwhile, in 1997, American investors including the Renco Group purchased shares in the enterprise from Centromin. As part of the deal, Centromin indemnified Renco and the other purchasers from third-party claims arising from toxic emissions before the date of the sale, and Peru guaranteed Centromin’s obligation. Renco and the other investors, in turn, agreed to perform some clean-up work and to be responsible to third parties for damage that they themselves caused.

In 2008, several Peruvian children sued Renco and others (Doe Run Resources Corp, D.R. Acquisition Corp., Renco Holdings, and several of their executives—Marvin Kaiser, Albert Bruce Neil, Jeffrey Zelms, Theodore Fox, Daniel Vornberg, and Ira Rennert) in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, Missouri. The defendants removed the case, but it was remanded. Back in the state court, the defendants tried to get Peru to defend them against the plaintiffs’ claims, and they asserted that Peru had not completed the promised environmental clean-up. Peru refused to enter the case, and Renco notified Peru of its intent to arbitrate under the US/Peru Trade Promotion Agreement.

After the arbitration commenced, Renco again removed the underlying case from the Missouri state court to the US District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the removal. Renco then moved to stay the case pending the outcome of the arbitration.

Section 3 of the FAA requires the court to stay an action if the action involves issues “referable to arbitration under … an agreement.” This is a narrower test than the test for removal, which asks only whether the claims “relate to” the arbitration. Renco and the others argued that the arbitration would decide whether Peru or the defendants ultimately should be liable for defending the US action and potentially paying the plaintiffs, but the judge accepted the plaintiff’s argument that the arbitration was really about arbitration, and that the issue of indemnification was an issue between Renco and Peru, not between the plaintiffs and Renco. Nor did the judge accept that there was a sufficient relationship between the US lawsuit and the arbitration to make a discretionary stay sensible. The factors, under Eighth Circuit precedent, are (1) the risk of inconsistent outcomes; (2) whether the parties will be bound by the arbitrator’s decision; and (3) prejudice resulting from delay. The judge found little risk of inconsistent rulings, found that the plaintiffs would not be bound by the arbitrator’s decision, and found that the plaintiffs would be prejudiced b a further delay, as their case had already been delayed for years and no court had yet reached the merits.

Photo credit: Darío Torres (license)

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Case of the Day: Verve Communications v. Software International

The case of the day is Verve Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Software International, Inc. (D.N.J. 2011). Verve was an Indian company that had a contract to perform services for Software International. The agreement had an arbitration clause calling for arbitration “on the papers, with no live witnesses or appearances by any party”, under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules.

The parties had a dispute about unpaid invoices, and Verve demanded arbitration, alleging breach of contract, fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Software International counterclaimed on theories of breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.

The arbitrator directed the parties to engage in discovery for a limited time, with any discovery disputes that could affect the scheduling of the hearing to be reported to him “immediately.” The arbitrator granted one extension and stated that no further extensions would be granted absent good cause. After the parties submitted their initial briefs, Software International requested sixty additional days for discovery, in order to allow it to access a computer server owned by a firm known as Devix. Software International claimed that the information on the server would show that Verve had performed defective work. Software International asserted that without the evidence from the server, it would be “unable to adequately respond to Verve’s Initial Submission …, present an adequate defense or prosecute its counterclaim.” But the arbitrator refused to permit the additional discovery, noting that Software International could have raised the issue earlier and that it had not provided enough detail regarding its claim of defective services or what it hoped to find on the server. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Verve, awarding it more than $300,000 in damages, and he denied the counterclaim outright.

Verve brought an action to confirm the award in state court. Software International removed the action to the federal court and moved to vacate the award. It asserted that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers, or alternatively, that by refusing to permit the discovery he had refused to postpone the hearing for good cause shown or had refused to hear material evidence. Each of these is a basis for vacatur under Section 10 of the FAA.

The judge rejected the notion that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers, because the award was not completely irrational. Nor did the refusal to hear evidence deprive Software International of a fair hearing, which is the touchstone of the analysis where the defendant claims the arbitrator refused to hear material evidence.

Because the award was not set aside, the court confirmed it. This was the correct answer to a fairly easy and straightforward case.

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