Tag Archives | Colombia

Case of the Day: Sea Search Armada v. Colombia

A Spanish GalleonAargh! We return today to Sea Search Armada v. Republic of Columbia, a case I first covered in October 2011. Here was my description of the facts:

According to the complaint, Sea Search Armada had an agreement with the government of Colombia for salvage of the treasure of the San Jose,a Spanish ship carrying $4 to $17 billion of coins and bullion. In 1708, when Britain really ruled the waves, the British navy sank the San Jose, and the ship came to rest off the coast of what is now Colombia. In 1980, the Colombian government authorized the Glocca Mora Co. to explore the continental shelf for shipwrecks, and the next year GMC discovered the wreck of the San Jose. GMC and Colombia agreed that GMC would be entitled to receive 35% of the treasure recovered. GMC assigned its rights to Sea Search Armada, and in 1984, Colombia agreed that SSA would be entitled to GMC’s 35% share, but it refused to enter a written contract with SSA and refused SSA permission to conduct full salvage operations at the shipwreck site. The Colombia parliament then passed a law giving the state the right to all of the treasure, leaving SSA with a 5% finder’s fee, which was to be taxed at 45% to boot!

SSA sued Colombia in its own courts in 1989. The Colombia Constitutional Court struck down the law at issue as unconstitutional in 1994. Later, the Circuit Court of Baranquilla held that SSA and Colombia each owned 50% of the San Jose treasure, although the source of the 50% figure is mysterious given that the original agreement called for a 65/35 split.

As we saw in the earlier post, SSA sued Colombia for recognition and enforcement of the Colombian judgment in the District of Columbia in 2010. SSA also sought damages in the amount of $17 billion. The judge dismissed the claim for recognition and enforcement on the grounds that the Colombian judgment was not one for damages but was merely declaratory and thus was not entitled to recognition UFMJRA, 1 which as its name suggests deals only with money judgments. 2

The DC Circuit has now summarily affirmed, just two weeks after oral argument. It adopted the district court’s reasoning in full.

The statute of limitations analysis seems correct. The courts are also correct to conclude that there is no claim here under the UFMJRA, but I still do not understand why there might not be an action for recognition of the Colombian judgment at common law rather than under the statute. Neither the UFMJRA nor the UFCMJRA precludes recognition of judgments not within the scope of the statute. See, e.g., DC Code § 15-371 (” This subchapter does not prevent the recognition under principles of comity or otherwise of a foreign-country judgment not within the scope of this subchapter”). But unfortunately, SSA’s brief does not really make this point, or does not make it clearly, 3 and so it is perhaps not surprising that the court missed it.

The case is not over: SSA has filed a petition against Colombia with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, alleging violations of Articles 21 and 25 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.

Photo credit: Yellow Cat

Notes:

  1. In 2011, the District of Columbia adopted the UFCMJRA.
  2. The judge also dismissed the common law claims for conversion and breach of contract on statute of limitations grounds—a point I didn’t cover in my prior post.
  3. The brief seems to argue that the judgment is a money judgment, but then it says: “In any case the principle of comity requires that the District Court enforce the Colombian decision.” Is this an argument that the judgment should be recognized even if it is not within the scope of the statute? It’s hard to say—the very next sentence is: ” The Uniform Enforcement of Money Judgments Act is a codification of common laws of comity.” As far as I can tell, SSA did not cite the savings provision of the Act.
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Case of the Day: Giraldo v. Drummond Co.

The case of the day is Giraldo v. Drummond Co. (N.D. Ala. 2012). According to the complaint, Drummond owned a coal mine in La Loma, in Colombia’s Cesar Province, and it shipped its coal from Santa Marta, in Magdalena Province. Both areas were under the control of the FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a leftist group, and the FARC would attack Drummond for the purpose of seizing its land and redistributing it to peasants. The United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, the AUC, was active in both Cesar and Magdalena Provinces, and by 1997 a civil war was raging there. By 1999, according to the complaint, Drummond had begun to side with the AUC, providing money for arms, soldiers, and operating expenses and getting involved in setting the AUC’s strategy in its war against the FARC. The plaintiffs alleged that “as a result of Drummond’s direct intervention in the civil conflict in these areas, hundreds of people living in Drummond’s railroad corridor were executed as the AUC utilized its well-known scorched earth methodology as a way to terrorize the local population and ensure they would no longer support or sympathize with the FARC.” The plaintiffs, who were the survivors of some of those allegedly executed, sued Drummond and three of its officials, Augusto Jiménez, President of Drummond Ltd., James Adkins, former director of security for Drummond Co., and Mike Tracy, president of DCI mining operations, asserting claims under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act.

The plaintiffs sought the issuance of letters rogatory, asserting that during discovery, they had discovered that several demobilized soldiers of the AUC might have information about the defendants’ relationship with the AUC and involvement in the assassination of union leaders in Colombia. But the deadline for issuing letters rogatory that the court had established had passed. The plaintiffs asserted that the deadline was inapplicable because they sought the new witnesses’ evidence for trial purposes, not only for discovery purposes. 1 The judge decided to issue the letters rogatory, but only on the condition that the depositions be completed by the discovery cut-off date, which the judge had earlier set to be more than a year after the letter rogatory cut-off date.

There is some hint in the decision that the parties had taken enough evidence pursuant to letters rogatory in the case that it was likely that the new witnesses’ evidence could be taken by the time discovery closed, approximately two months after the court’s order. I hope that is the case, because otherwise, given the typical length of time it takes to execute a letter rogatory, this decision could well be a Pyrrhic victory for the plaintiffs.

Notes:

  1. In some American states, e.g., Illinois, there is a strong distinction between “trial” depositions and “discovery” depositions. In other American states, e.g., Massachusetts, where I practice, there doesn’t seem to be any particular distinction. So this portion of the discussion does not seem particularly compelling to me. But it may make more sense to lawyers practicing in Alabama.
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Case of the Day: Sea Search Armada v. Republic of Colombia

Spanish Galleon

Aargh! The case of the day, Sea Search Armada v. Republic of Colombia (D.D.C. 2011), is, in the words of the judge, “like a marriage between a Patrick O’Brian glorious-age-of-sail novel and a John Buchan potboiler of international intrigue.” According to the complaint, Sea Search Armada had an agreement with the government of Colombia for salvage of the treasure of the San Jose,a Spanish ship carrying $4 to $17 billion of coins and bullion. In 1708, when Britain really ruled the waves, the British navy sank the San Jose, and the ship came to rest off the coast of what is now Colombia. In 1980, the Colombian government authorized the Glocca Mora Co. to explore the continental shelf for shipwrecks, and the next year GMC discovered the wreck of the San Jose. GMC and Colombia agreed that GMC would be entitled to receive 35% of the treasure recovered. GMC assigned its rights to Sea Search Armada, and in 1984, Colombia agreed that SSA would be entitled to GMC’s 35% share, but it refused to enter a written contract with SSA and refused SSA permission to conduct full salvage operations at the shipwreck site. The Colombia parliament then passed a law giving the state the right to all of the treasure, leaving SSA with a 5% finder’s fee, which was to be taxed at 45% to boot!

SSA sued Colombia in its own courts in 1989. The Colombia Constitutional Court struck down the law at issue as unconstitutional in 1994. Later, the Circuit Court of Baranquilla held that SSA and Colombia each owned 50% of the San Jose treasure, although the source of the 50% figure is mysterious given that the original agreement called for a 65/35 split.

In 2010, SSA sued Colombia in the District of Columbia, seeking recognition and enforcement of the judgment and seeking damages in the amount of $17 billion. The District of Columbia has enacted the Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act, which applies, on its face, only to foreign judgments “granting or denying recovery of a sum of money.” The judge granted Colombia’s motion to dismiss. The gist of the decision was that because the Colombian judgment did not award any damages to SSA, it was not within the scope of the UFMJRA. First, the value of the treasure had not been determined, and SSA’s $ $17 billion figure was only its own estimate. Second, the award was, in essence, a declaration of the parties’ rights rather than an award of damages.

I think the judgment is correct as far as it goes—the UFMJRA does not apply to the Colombian declaratory judgment for the reasons the judge identified. But I think the judge was too hasty in dismissing the case with prejudice. It’s true that SSA identified the wrong legal theory, as it had no claim under the Uniform Act, and it may be that the Colombian judgment is not entitled to enforcement in any case. But there is a common law of recognition of foreign judgments that probably survives enactment of the UFMJRA with regard to judgments not within the scope of the statute. According to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:

A valid decree rendered in a foreign nation that orders or enjoins the doing of an act will usually be recognized in the United States. That is to say, such a decree will usually be given the same res judicata effect in the United States that it enjoys in the nation of its rendition. So far as enforcement is concerned, it can safely be said that a valid foreign nation decree that orders the payment of money will usually be enforced in the United States. Existing authority does not warrant the making of any definite statement as to the enforcement of decrees that order the doing of other kinds of acts or that enjoin the doing of an act. American courts, however, have usually given the same measure of respect to judgments rendered in foreign nations, which meet the requirements stated in § 98, Comment c, that they give to judgments rendered in sister States. It can therefore be assumed that a decree rendered in a foreign nation which orders or enjoins the doing of an act will be enforced in this country provided that such enforcement is necessary to effectuate the decree and will not impose an undue burden upon the American court and provided further that in the view of the American court the decree is consistent with fundamental principles of justice and of good morals.

I think the judge should at least have considered whether the declaration of rights was res judicata between the parties in the United States.

Photo credit: Yellow Cat (license)

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