Tag Archives | China

Case of the Day: Wultz v. Bank of China

The case of the day is Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. 2013). We first considered this case in November 2012. Here was my description of the facts from the prior post:

In 2006, Daniel Wultz was killed, and Yekutiel Wultz injured, in a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. Members of the Wultz family sued the Bank of China, alleging that the bank had violated the Antiterrorism Act, 18 USC § 2333, and that it was guilty of negligence etc.

In the earlier decision, the judge ordered the bank to produce documents under the FRCP rather than requiring resort to the Hague Evidence Convention, notwithstanding the bank’s invocation of China’s bank secrecy laws. The only exception the judge established was for “confidential regulatory documents created by the Chinese government whose production is clearly prohibited under Chinese law.” The judge’s order, however, “had little effect.” As the judge noted, “it eventually became clear that BOC was refusing to produce the requested Chinese documents not only based on the bank secrecy laws … but also based on other laws, including laws primarily concerned with combating money laundering and other illegal financial transactions.”

The judge conducted another hearing and issued another order finding that the bank would not be required to produce communications from the bank to the Chinese government “whose disclosure is specifically and categorically prohibited under” Chinese anti-money laundering laws and similar laws. But she invited further briefing.

The Bank offered expert opinion testimony to prove that under China’s state secrets law and its anti-money laundering legislation, it was forbidden to disclose the documents. The judge had concerns about the testimony on the grounds that it was “for the most part not based on empirical evidence of how the laws he discusses have (or have not) been implemented,” but instead “on interpretations of the general, abstract language of Chinese laws and regulations, supplemented by his own considerations of policy.” Nevertheless, the judge found that on balance, it was more likely than not that Chinese law did forbid the Bank from producing the documents, pointing in particular to Article 15(2) of the anti-money laundering law, which provides:

Financial institutions and their staff shall keep confidential … suspicious transaction reports, their cooperation with the PBOC in the investigation of suspicious transactions[,] and other information related to anti-money laundering activities, which shall not be provided to clients or others in violation of regulations.

Thus the question was whether, under Aérospatiale, production of the documents should be compelled even though it would be illegal under Chinese law. The judge considered that if the documents are not produced, there might be no other way for the plaintiffs to prove that the BOC had notice that some of its accounts were being used to fund the terrorist organizations that were responsible for the terrorist attack. On the other hand, China has an interest in enforcement of its anti-money laundering laws, which are aimed in part at depriving terrorist organizations of funding. And requiring production of documents that China considers to be state secrets could offend China’s sovereignty. The judge also considered that the BOC had tried to avoid its discovery obligations in bad faith, since it had failed to comply with earlier discovery orders and taken bad-faith interpretations of those earlier orders.

Weighing the factors, and “recogniz[ing] the seriousness” of her decision, the judge granted the motion to compel in part. In particular, it compelled production of communications from the Chinese government to the BOC relating to the accounts and the account-holder in question, and it compelled production of documents concerning anti-money laundering problems at the Bank’s Guangdong branch and at the head office for a certain period of time.

The judge went out of her way to indicate that the result would have been the same wherever in the world the bank was located, and that in similar circumstances foreign courts could expect the aid of US courts in obtaining such records from US banks. It remains to be seen whether China will be mollified by such sentiments.

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Case of the Day: Zhang v. Baidu.com

The case of the day is Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The plaintiffs were Jian Zhang, Guang Yang, Wa Xue, Tian Cheng Wang, Liqun Chen, Shenqi Fu, Shuyuan Song, and Yuhong Zhang, who described themselves as “promoters of democracy in China through their writings, publications and reporting of pro-democracy events.” They sued Baidu.com, the Chinese search engine, and the People’s Republic of China, for conspiring to prevent their “pro-democracy political speech” from showing up in Baidu search results. The complaint asserted claims for violations of federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and under New York law.

The plaintiffs sent requests for service of process on both defendants to the Chinese Ministry of Justice, China’s central authority under the Hague Service Convention. 1 The Ministry refused to execute the request for service on the grounds, permitted by Article 13 of the Convention, that the “execution of the request would infringe the sovereignty or security of the People’s Republic of China.”

Baidu moved to dismiss for insufficient service of process, and the plaintiffs cross-moved for entry of default judgment against both Baidu and China. China had not appeared in the case.

The judge denied the motion for entry of default judgment. He properly refused to consider the propriety of China’s invocation of Article 13: “[T]he Court lacks jurisdiction to address whether China properly invoked Article 13. Indeed, the Convention is clear that difficulties which may arise in connection with the transmission of judicial documents for service shall be settled through diplomatic channels.” 2 The judge cited Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, the case of the day from May 18, 2011, for this proposition. Fortunately, he did not follow the erroneous decision in Gurung v. Malhotra, where the judge incorrectly did consider whether the foreign state’s invocation of Article 13 was proper.

The judge also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that noncompliance with the Convention was excused because the defendants had actual notice of the action. Easy.

Last, the judge rejected the argument that under Article 15 of the Convention a default judgment was proper. Article 15 deals with cases in which the plaintiff receives no response from the foreign central authority for six months, despite its best efforts. Here, the plaintiffs received a response, but not a response they liked.

The plaintiff requested leave to serve Baidu by alternate means under FRCP 4(f)(3), namely by service on its US counsel. This leads to the only sour note in the decision. The judge gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard on that question, but citing the much-maligned (by me) Gurung, he wrote: “It is not clear whether a court may authorize an alternative means of service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) where, as in this case, the receiving nation has declined to effect service pursuant to Article 13 of the Hague Convention.” This seems clearly wrong. The Convention governs only service of process abroad. A foreign state cannot immunize its nationals from suit in the United States by refusing to serve them with process. If the plaintiff can effect service of process without transmitting a document to the foreign state, then the Convention is simply inapplicable. To take a hypothetical, suppose the president of Baidu traveled to the United States. Surely the plaintiffs could serve process on the company by delivering the summons and complaint to him. Service on Baidu’s counsel is no different.

The judge also ordered the plaintiffs to show cause why the claims against China should not be dismissed. Presumably the plaintiffs will respond that, having tried service under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2), they are now going to attempt service under the remaining options available under the FSIA.

I would like to editorialize for a moment to make two points. First: SDNY judges, stop citing and following Gurung! It’s a bad decision. Confident as I am that the judges of the SDNY have better thing to do than reading Letters Blogatory, I am working on an article about Gurung for publication in a law review, which I hope may catch their eyes. But if you’re a law clerk and you’re reading this, raise the issue with your judge!

Second, I think that leaving aside the service of process issues, this litigation is regrettable. Censorship of the internet and of search results is a big problem, not just for the authors whose work is censored but for China itself and for its development. That’s my view, anyway. But the plaintiffs’ lawyer in this case isn’t doing anyone any favors by bringing federal civil rights claims that seem to me at least to be plainly untenable. And we haven’t even begun to discuss the jurisdictional issues that both defendants are likely to raise, and that China in particular is likely to raise under the FSIA. Surely this is not the best way to promote a more open internet in China.

Notes:

  1. As an aside: this was a proper method of seeking to serve the Chinese state under the FSIA, since in the absence of a “special arrangement for service,” the first method a plaintiff must attempt is service “in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2).
  2. This is a reference to Article 14.
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Case of the Day: Morningstar v. Dejun

George Washington

The Father Of His Country: Letters Blogatory Wishes its Readers a Happy Washington’s Birthday!

The case of the day is Morningstar v. Dejum (C.D. Cal. 2013). Morningstar is yet another case involving, according to the complaint, a “reverse takeover” maneuver in which a Chinese company enters the US market by merging into a publicly traded US shell corporation. The plaintiffs sought to serve Qiu Jianping and Zou Dejun, Chinese nationals and officers of Rino International Corp., the US company involved in the transaction, by alternativem eans under FRCP 4(f)(3). In particular, after trying and failing to effect service under the Hague Service Convention, they sought to serve the two by service on Rino at its California office, service on Rino’s registered agent for service of process in California, and service on their US lawyer, in each case with instructions to forward the documents to the foreign defendants.

We have covered many similar cases, and with the exception of cases that impose some sort of requirement of first resort to the Convention, they generally come out the same. Under the Volkswagen principle, such service is permissible as long as it is reasonably likely to give the defendants actual notice of the suit. That’s not to say that a judgment based on such service will be readily enforceable in China, though!

Photo credit: The Athenaeum

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